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STORE VS. NATIONAL BRANDS: 
A PRODUCT LINE MIX PUZZLE 
 





This paper examines retailers’ strategic decisions about store brand introduction 
when each retailer can stock a limited number of brands. The different product line mix 
equilibria depend on demand parameters that measure the cross-effect across national 
and store brands and the cross-effect within each brand type, thus leading to a simple 
testable implication. Store brand introduction is determined by the combination of the 
three effects that result from replacing a national brand by a store brand; the direct 
effect, the exclusivity effect and the in-store effect. Interestingly enough, we identify 
conditions under which similar retailers take different decisions concerning their 
product line mix. 
 
JEL Classification: L13, L23. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last decades, private labels brands or store brands have become a popular and
proﬁtable marketing strategy both in the United States and Europe. According to AC-
Nielsen’s report The Power of Private Label 2005 private label sales accounted for 17% of
the value sales over the 12 months ending the ﬁrst quarter of 2005. Europe is the leading
private label region with an aggregated private label share in value sales of 23% for the
17 European countries included in the study. Switzerland (45%), Germany (30%), Great
Britain (28%), Spain (26%) and Belgium (25%) were the ﬁve European countries with
the highest private label shares. North America with a penetration rate of 16%, saw a
signiﬁcant growth of private label sales up 7%.1 There are a number of reasons explaining
the substantial development of private label programmes. Among other beneﬁts, private
labels add diversity to a retailer’s product line in a category; a retailer utilizes them as
a measure of exclusivity to diﬀerentiate from manufacturers’ brands, since by deﬁnition
private labels can only be sold by the retailer that carries them; and the retailer gross
margins on their private labels are higher than those obtained on national brands.
A concentrated retail sector appears to facilitate the growth of private labels (Dobson,
1998, Steiner, 2004). Store brands give retailers a stronger position against brand man-
ufacturers. In particular, they serve as a competitive tool in obtaining price concessions
from manufacturers. Private label products are further advantaged by the retailer’s abil-
ity to delist certain brands and the managing of scarce shelf space.2 From a consumer
perspective, store brands are viewed as reasonable quality products that are typically
priced lower than leading manufacturer brands. Despite the rather apparent advantages
of private label products, they are not introduced by every store and in every product
category. Managerial strategies about private label introduction are not solely driven by
the manufacturer-retailer relationship but are also an important dimension of competition
in oligopolistic retail markets.3
1This recent report includes 38 countries and 80 categories and was released in Septemper 2005.
2"The newly national Macy’s chain is a prime example of a retailer focused on driving the top and
bottom lines through the sales of its own brands. According to a report in the Chicago Tribune,t h e
retailer has jettisoned designer labels such as Prada, Miu Miu and Jimmy Choo, while others such as the
Yves St. Laurent handbag collection have been seriously cutback." (Extracted from "Store Brands and
Exclusive Labels Make or Break the Retailer", by George Anderson, 9/12/06 in www.retailwire.com).
3As reported in the AC Nielsen study, within individual product categories, refrigerated foods are now
the largest private label category worldwide with a 32 % share, having replaced paper, plastic and wraps
in the top spot. Alternatively, private label shares within the areas of personal care, cosmetics and baby
food were the smallest at less than 5%.
3This paper addresses retailers’ strategic decisions about private label introduction when
shelf space is limited and shows the relevance of demand interactions. There are two dis-
tinguishing features to our model as compared with the existing theoretical literature.
Firstly, previous analyses have mainly examined the rivalry among national brands and
private labels looking at a single retailer. We consider retailer interaction as it is obvious
that retailers compete on a number of dimensions, and product line mix is an important
one among them; the development of private label programmes should be regarded as
a strategic variable in retail competition. Secondly, and within the context of a retail
duopoly, the scarcity of shelf space (and its role to extract better terms of payment) is
taken into account; if a retailer decides to introduce a store brand then it needs to decide
which national brand to take oﬀ the shelf in favour of the store brand.4 As such the
model will be stylized to illustrate that private labels are not always introduced by every
store; this occurs despite the fact of not giving any advantage to national brands neither
in demand or cost grounds.
Speciﬁcally, a multi-stage game is developed where retailers, after knowing the transfer
prices, decide whether to introduce their store brands and then compete in the market.
The key question is to identify what conditions make it proﬁtable for retailers to replace a
national brand with a private label. Our analysis draws attention to demand parameters
that measure the cross-eﬀect across brand types, that is, national brands vis a vis store
brands, and the cross-eﬀect within each brand type. With one national brand manufac-
turer we ﬁnd i) that only one retailer introduces its store brand when the cross eﬀect within
brand types exceeds the cross eﬀect across brand types, and ii) that the retailer that does
not replace obtains better terms of payment from the manufacturer. These results are
shown to be robust under quite a number of changes in the assumptions. For a retailer,
store brand introduction implies both a direct eﬀect, because of saving on the transfer
price born by the national brand, and an exclusivity eﬀect, because the store brand is
uniquely sold by that one retailer. This gives rise to always having one store brand in the
market. Whether both retailers take the replacement decision depends on which of the
cross eﬀects is higher; retail interaction leads to the market conﬁguration that entails a
softer intensity of competition. In case the national brand manufacturer may retain one
of the retailers he will do so by lowering the transfer price, a result that also follows from
the retailer’s threat to drop the national brand.
4Steiner (2004) refers that the provision of favourable shelf space is one of the most potent weapons
in the private label’s arsenal. The retailer’s power to decide on the placement of national brands and its
private labels on the store shelves is a distinguish prerogative from competition among national brands.
4With two national brands and assuming that retailers are multiproduct sellers, iii) the
equilibrium entails no store brands in the market when the cross eﬀect across brand types
is large enough, greater than that within brand types, and for a low enough transfer price,
and iv) it is shown that only one of the retailers introduces its store brand for a certain
range of the demand parameters and the transfer price. The intuition here heavily lies on
the importance of the in-store eﬀect. This additional eﬀect stems from retailers’ decision
about their product line mix in order to internalize competition to their own advantage.
T h ei n - s t o r ee ﬀect is negative and large when the cross eﬀect within brand types is well
below the cross eﬀect across brand types. A low transfer price supposes a small direct
eﬀect and therefore neither retailer introduces its store brand. But as the transfer price
increases, and when the cross eﬀect across brand types is not too large, we show that
one retailer ﬁnds store brand introduction advantageous in equilibrium. Therefore, simi-
lar retailers take diﬀerent decisions because one prefers internalizing competition between
a national brand and its store brand whereas another is best oﬀ carrying two national
brands. Most interestingly, the assumption that national brands are supplied by a com-
petitive fringe of manufacturers, v) results in either no store brand introduction, or one
store brand in the market, or two store brands, depending on the particular relationships
between the demand parameters. This ﬁnding further emphasizes the relevance of retailer
interaction rather than upstream market power.
Despite the increasing growth in private labels as well as their competitive interaction
with national brands, little theoretical research exists in this area. To the best of our
knowledge, the modeling of retailer competition when a retailer’s decision to carry a store
brand must take into account that shelf space is limited has not yet been undertaken.5
Mills (1995) and Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) considered a successive monopoly
to examine the strategic role of a private label that is sold along with a national brand
product. These authors took an important ﬁrst step in exploring how private label in-
troduction aﬀects the manufacturer-retailer relationship. They showed that private label
marketing allows the retailer to elicit a price concession from the national brand manu-
facturer, that it improves the performance of the vertical structure and that it reduces
the double marginalization problem.6 Recently, Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007), using a
5There is an extensive literature devoted to private label analysis, most of which is of an empirical
nature. A wide number of issues have been examined such as the variation in store brand penetration by
product category (Sethuraman, 1992, Hoch and Banerji, 1993) and by retailer (Dhar and Hoch, 1997) and
the competitive pricing interaction between national brands and private labels (Putsis, 1997, Cotterill and
Putsis, 2000, Gabrielsen et al., 2001, and Harris et al., 2002).
6Bontems et al. (1999) analyze the retailer’s choice of quality for the private label product when
marginal costs of production are quality dependent and ﬁnd some contradictory results to Mills (1995) and
5vertical diﬀerentiation approach with loyal as well as switching consumers, allow the na-
tional brand producer to condition the transfer price on whether the retailer introduces a
private label or not. Interestingly, private label introduction may lead to a price increase
on the national brand, which can be detrimental to welfare thus pointing out a conﬂict
between the private and the social incentives. A relevant feature, which is common to the
aforementioned analyses, is worth being noted: the retailer is a single-product seller who
becomes a multi-product seller when the private label is introduced.
When the retailer markets several national brands, it must consider the cross-price sen-
sitivity measuring the intensity of inter-brand competition between the national brands.
Adding a private label makes the retailer to regard not only the cross-price sensitivity
between existing national brands but also the price sensitivity between a national brand
and the store brand. A setting with several national brands and a retailer is considered by
Raju et al. (1995). These authors provide an analytical framework for examining condi-
tions under which a private label is more likely to increase category proﬁts for the retailer.
Sayman et al. (2002) extend their model by allowing the retailer also to decide how the
store brand is positioned relative to the two national brands. The optimal strategy for the
retailer is to position the store brand as close as possible to the leading national brand,
which means reducing the consumers’ perceptual distance between the store brand and the
national brand. In this way, the retailer can decrease the monopoly power of the leading
national brand and increase their own relative bargaining power as lower transfer prices are
achieved — the double marginalization problem is mitigated. It is often observed that store
brands imitate the category leader. Both these papers analyze the proﬁtability of adding
a store brand to an assortment of national brands. On the other hand, Scott Morton and
Zettelmeyer (2004) have considered two-part tariﬀ contracts in a setting where a retailer
chooses between carrying two national brand and replacing one of them by a private label,
in addition to the label’s positioning. These authors oﬀer an explanation of why a retailer
values store brands instead of existing national brands. The retailer introduces a private
label that is a close substitute for the national brand. The retailer’s control over private
label positioning coupled with limited shelf space7 make store brands so valuable to him.8
Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998).
7The relevance of retailers’ limited shelf space was ﬁrstly analyzed by the pioneering papers by Shaﬀer
(1991a, 1991b), who examined optimal strategies for upstream ﬁrms when setting their pricing strategies
in the presence of retailers’ stocking decisions.
8It is commonly argued that private labels serves as a product diﬀerentiation device for a retailer.
Vertical diﬀerentiation is essentially quality-driven and thus the paper by Bontems et al. (1999) can be
viewed to treat a positioning strategy by the retailer, that is, by his choice about the perceptual distance
between store brands and national brands at the eyes of consumers. The models of store brand positioning
6Our analysis can be seen as complementary to the above literature by considering
the strategic interaction between retailers when deciding upon private label introduction,
obtaining results that are consistent with some of the observed variety of phenomena in
the retailing sector.9 Our modelling leads to a simple testable condition concerning the
strategic use of store brands which basically relies on demand parameters, and provides
some useful managerial implications. The paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a formal model of retail competition by ﬁrst describing the basic assumptions
and then solving for the equilibrium store brand strategies when there is just one national
brand manufacturer. A robustness analysis is undertaken. Section 3 analyzes the case of
several national brands and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A Simple Model with Retail Competition
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We next present the model assumptions and the general demand structure for two national
brands and two store brands (one for each of the two retailers) from which the diﬀerent
settings follow. Two retailers face a large number of consumers. The representative
consumer maximizes V (qn1,q n2,q s1,q s2,y) subject to the budget constraint I = y + qTp,
where I is consumer’s income and y i st h ea m o u n to ft h ec o m p o s i t ec o m m o d i t yt a k e na s
numéraire, qT =( qn1,q n2,q s1,q s2) and pT =( pn1,p n2,p s1,p s2), where q0s and p0s denote
total output and price for each brand, respectively. There are two brand types, national
and store, and subscripts denote national brand one, national brand two, store brand from
retailer one and store brand from retailer two, respectively.10 The function V is linear in
the composite good and can be written as V = y + U(qn1,q n2,q s1,q s2). The function U is
assumed quadratic and strictly concave as follows
by Sayman et al. (2002) and by Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) can be catalogued as models of
horizontal and of vertical diﬀerentiation, respectively. Recently, Choi and Coughlan (2006) have combined
both diﬀerentiation diimensions. Furthermore, the manufacturer might employ counterstrategies to lessen
the force of private label programmes. Precisely, Mills (1999) has considered that widening the quality
gap is one such measure that allows the manufacturer to ﬁght back and limit the diversion of proﬁts to
the retailer due to private label introduction.
9There are many other features that help characterize the recent change in the retailing landscape
such as the substantial quality improvement of private labels, the growth of superstores at the expense
of traditional outlets, brand reputation creating loyalty to a particular supermarket chain, advertising
expenditure and so on. See Dobson (1998) for a comprehensive survey and a discussion on the economic
welfare implications of private label products.
10The terms private label and store brand will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. We will
however employ subscripts s to keep with the notation in the received literature in this area.
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Concavity is guaranteed for Z a positive deﬁnite matrix. This is the case as long as the
eigenvalues are strictly positive, that is, βh >γ h, for h = n,s, and ε2 <
(βn+γn)(βs+γs)
4 .
The maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint results in the following inverse
linear demand system,
pn1 = αn − βnqn1 − γnqn2 − εqs1 − εqs2, (2)
pn2 = αn − γnqn1 − βnqn2 − εqs1 − εqs2, (3)
ps1 = αs − εqn1 − εqn2 − βsqs1 − γsqs2, (4)
ps2 = αs − εqn1 − εqn2 − γsqs1 − βsqs2, (5)
where βh measures own eﬀects of brands, γh captures the cross-eﬀe c tw i t h i ne a c hb r a n d
type, and ε measures the cross-eﬀect across brand types. Note that although own eﬀects
dominate cross eﬀects within each brand type, the latter may or may not exceed the cross
eﬀect across brand types, i.e. γh ≶ ε. Although a diﬀerent utility function could lead
to another demand structure, and there is conﬂicting evidence regarding the ﬁto fl i n e a r
demand to market data, we employ the above structure for analytical tractability. In fact,
we consider the simplest and most interpretable possible case, although stylized, in which
we have the complete spectrum of brand type conﬁgurations.
Since we are particularly concerned with studying the strategic introduction of a private
label, and for the sake of the exposition, we assume symmetry as follows: αn = αs =1 ,
βn = βs =1 , and γn = γs = γ. Consequently the range for the cross eﬀect parameters is
characterized by 0 <γ<1 and 0 <ε<
1+γ
2 , or equivalently 0 <ε<1 and max{2ε −
1,0} <γ<1. T h ef a c tt h a tαn = αs means that neither the national brand nor the
store brand is given any "ad hoc" advantage that could be traced back to consumers’
preferences; this simpliﬁcation allows us to better focus our studying of the replacement
of national brands by store ones for strategic reasons. The received literature assumes
that the base level demand for a national brand is larger than for a store brand. We wish
to put store brands on equal terms to national brands to show that even so store brands
8are not always introduced. The relevant parameter space is therefore a subset of the 1×1
square in the (γ,ε) space as presented in Figure 1.
We assume that retailers are not diﬀerentiated in the sense that consumers of a brand
receive the same utility no matter which retailer is selling that particular brand to them.
Each manufacturer has constant marginal costs c which without loss of generality are
assumed to be zero. If a retailer sells a national brand product it pays wj per unit of
output to manufacturer j, for j =1 ,2. Each private label is supplied by a competitive
fringe of manufacturers at constant marginal costs t, assumed to be zero. By assuming both
national and store brands marginal costs to be zero we are ensuring that any diﬀerence
in transfer prices between both brand types can only be explained as a result of market
power on the part of the national brand manufacturing industry. Finally, in order to take
into account that shelf space is limited, a retailer is forced to replace a national brand in
case a store brand is introduced.
As already indicated, it is our purpose to analyze the introduction of store brands from
a strategic point of view. We will then develop a model with a duopolistic retail structure
and begin with the existence of one national brand. Since a retailer’s shelf space is limited,
we assume that if a private label is carried this can only be done by replacing the national
brand. An extension to the case of two national brands is taken up in Section 3 below,
where retailers are multiproduct sellers.
3 No Competition Upstream: The monopolist manufac-
turer case.
Suppose a monopolist national brand manufacturer, say of brand one, whose product is
sold through two undiﬀerentiated retailers. The contract used by the manufacturer is a
linear price contract. We propose the following multi-stage game with observed actions. In
the ﬁrst stage, the manufacturer sets the transfer price w. In the second, the replacement
stage, retailer one, R1, and retailer two, R2, decide independently and simultaneously
whether to introduce its own store brand. If so the store brand replaces the national
brand (strategy r), where r stands for replacement, otherwise it sells the national brand
(strategy n), where n stands for no replacement. There is quantity competition in the last
stage of the game and then consumers purchase the products. We look for the subgame
perfect equilibria of the game.
Note that three qualitatively diﬀerent quantity competition outcomes may arise: a)




 demand functions are obtained by taking qT =( qn1,0,0,0); b) a demand symmetric
diﬀerentiated duopoly where the national brand competes against a store brand, but
with diﬀerent marginal costs for retailers, now considering either qT =( qn1,0,q s1,0) or
qT =( qn1,0,0,q s2); and c) a symmetric diﬀerentiated duopoly with two store brands
where now qT =( 0 ,0,q s1,q s2).
The timing of the game captures that private label introduction is a long-term decision
compared with the decision on quantities. Furthermore, as the manufacturer decides ﬁrst
it anticipates the fact that retailers may drop its brand, which is taken into account when
deciding on its transfer price, and this leads to retailers attaining better terms of payment
from the manufacturer.
For any given w, the second stage decision by retailers gives rise to three diﬀerent
subgames. In case that no retailer replaces the national brand, the (n,n) subgame, re-




9 , with w ≤ 1 for nonnegative outputs.
The pair of superscripts denote the store brand strategy taken by retailer one and retailer
two, respectively. In case one of the retailers replaces the national brand whereas the











2 , with w ≤ (1 − ε
2)
for nonnegative outputs. Finally, when both retailers decide to introduce its store brand,





A retailer’s best reply, say R1, in the second stage is as follows: First, R1 will introduce
the store brand when R2 does not if and only if Rrn
1 (w) − Rnn
1 (w) > 0. The diﬀerence is
equal to
((2−ε)(1−ε)+(4−ε)(1+ε)w)((2−ε)(5+ε)−(4+ε)(1−ε)w)
9(4−ε2)2 ≡ Φr(w), and Φr(w) is positive for
the relevant range of w. Therefore, one of the retailers always introduces its store brand.










≡ Φrr(w) is positive. It happens that Φrr(w) > 0
for w>
(2−ε)(γ−ε)
2(2+γ) ≡ ¯ w. It follows that ¯ w>0 if and only if γ>εand it is smaller than
the bound imposed on w to guarantee nonnegative outputs. Otherwise, for ε ≥ γ, ¯ w<0
and then Φrr(w) > 0 for all w. The analysis is similar for retailer two.
In the ﬁrst stage the manufacturer, M, decides on the value of the transfer price that
maximizes its payoﬀs. Note that depending on the value of w, one of the retailers may










for0 ≤ w ≤ ¯ w
0 for ¯ w<w<(1 − ε
2)
(6)
From the inspection of the critical value ¯ w, it is clear that for γ<ε ,Mis unable to
retain one of the retailers in the sense that it will get zero payoﬀs irrespective of w since




(2+γ)2. However, for γ>ε ,the manufacturer has to set a transfer
price that maximizes its proﬁts subject to the restriction that w ∈ [0, ¯ w]. In doing so, it





when w is unrestricted, denoted by
w∗, with ¯ w. It turns out that w∗ is equal to 2−ε
4 and this value is always greater than ¯ w.
Therefore, we conclude that for ε<γ<1,Mchooses a transfer price equal to ¯ w, one of
the retailers decides not to introduce its store brand and the payoﬀs for the manufacturer
are M(¯ w)=
(2−ε)(γ−ε)





the one that does not replace are Rrn
2 = Rnr
1 = 1
(2+γ)2. The next proposition summarizes
the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 1 When the cross eﬀect across brand types exceed that within brand types
both retailers replace the national brand. However, when the opposite occurs, only one
retailer introduces its store brand. The other retailer does not, but it obtains better terms
of payment from the manufacturer than in a setting where it had not the option to introduce
a store brand.
Sequentiality and replacement when introducing a store brand in the presence of retail
c o m p e t i t i o nm a k ei ts u c ht h a tar e t a i l e rm a yﬁnd it unproﬁtable to market a store brand.
To see the intuition consider a standard vertical structure with just one retailer. Given
the assumptions of the model the monopolist retailer will sell the national brand and not
introduce the store brand as long as αn exceeds αs;i tw i l lo fc o u r s eb ei n d i ﬀerent if αn =
αs =1 . In other words, demand parameters related with the intensity of competition
are obviously irrelevant. When there is a retail duopoly, retailers choose the combination
of brands leading to softer competition intensity. Note that there is just one national
brand and that retailers are single-product sellers. The introduction of a store brand by
a retailer has, in this context, two eﬀects. On the one hand, and because of limited shelf
space, a national brand is replaced by the store brand. This directly aﬀects retailer’s
proﬁts since each brand type implies a diﬀerent margin for the retailer. This is a direct
eﬀect, which is positive as long as the national brand bears a positive transfer price. On
the other hand, there exists an exclusivity eﬀect because replacement implies leaving the
12rival retailer as the unique seller of the national brand. The two eﬀects are in favour
of replacement and therefore one store brand in the market is guaranteed. The most
competitive outcome is reached when neither retailer introduces its store brand for there
is intra-brand competition in the national brand and retailers are always worse under
a homogeneous duopoly. Note however that the exclusivity eﬀect is not present when
we compare the market conﬁguration with one store brand and another with two. In
both cases each retailer is an exclusive seller of a particular brand. We then conclude
that whether both retailers or just one of them introduces a store brand depends on the
distance between the own-eﬀect and each of the cross-eﬀects and the size of the direct
eﬀect. Consider that the cross-eﬀect across brand types, ε, exceeds the cross-eﬀect within
each brand type, γ. Then, a duopoly where both store brands are in the market supposes
a distance between γ and β (assumed equal to one) that is greater than the distance
between ε and β were there a duopoly with the national brand and just one store brand.
The former setting entails a lower degree of competition intensity, retailers’ payoﬀsa r e
therefore higher and we ﬁnd introduction of both the store brands. The contrary happens
when γ exceeds ε and then the national brand is replaced by just one retailer since the
manufacturer is able to reduce the magnitude of the direct eﬀect, by lowering the transfer
price, to convince the retailer not to replace.
This simple modeling provides an easy testable implication to better understand why
some outlets introduce store brands in some categories and not in others. Further note
that, from Proposition 1 above, a retailer may threat the national brand manufacturer
with not carrying his brand to achieve better terms of payment vis a vis a situation where
this option was not available. In fact a positive externality takes place since there is
already one retailer that replaces the national brand, and then the other retailer obtains
a lower transfer price in case of non-replacement.
3.1 Robustness
In this subsection we wish to analyze how changes in a given assumption will aﬀect the
result. One wonders whether the foregoing result continues to hold a) assuming away mar-
ket power on the side of the national brand manufacturer, b) with an alternative timing,
c) with price competition among retailers, d) in the case the manufacturer is capable of
conditioning the transfer price charged depending on whether the contract is exclusive or
not and, e) under other terms of payment in the contract.
A competitive fringe of manufacturers.
Suppose that the national brand is supplied by a competitive fringe of manufacturers.
13In such an eventuality the transfer price is zero since there is no market power in the
upstream manufacturing industry. The payoﬀs corresponding to the above multi-stage
game, where the ﬁrst stage is obviously void, are Rrr
1 (w =0 )=Rrr
2 (w =0 )= 1
(2+γ)2,
Rnr
1 (w =0 )=Rrn
2 (w =0 )=Rnr
2 (w =0 )=Rrn
1 (w =0 )= 1
(2+ε)2 and Rnn
1 (w =0 )=
Rnn
2 (w =0 )=1
9. It is easy to see that Proposition 1 continues to hold for the special case
w =0 . Interestingly, the fact that not all retailers introduce a store brand arises regardless
of the existence of manufacturer market power.
Timing
Consider now several changes in the sequence of moves. As suggested by the empirical
evidence above, stores have developed private label programmes in sequence. In particular
and to account for such sequentiality in the strategic introduction of store brands we
assume that one retailer decides whether to replace the national brand in the initial stage.
Next, the manufacturer decides on the value of the transfer price in the second stage; note
that w will depend now on the previous choice made by retailer. Then the second retailer
decides its store brand strategy. Finally, retailers compete in quantities. This change in
timing has no eﬀect on the statement on Proposition 1, with the qualiﬁcation that it is
the retailer that moves ﬁrst the one that always replaces the national brand when the
equilibrium results in replacement by only one retailer.
An alternative change in timing is that retailers simultaneously decide on their store
brand strategies ﬁrst and then, knowing the decision made before, the manufacturer de-
cides on the transfer price. In such an eventuality, the manufacturer is unable to inﬂuence
the retailers’ decision, and the national brand is left out of the market.
Price competition.
Assume now that there is price competition in the last stage of the game. In such
a case it clearly follows that there is always a unilateral incentive to replace a national
brand since otherwise both retailers obtain zero proﬁt due to Bertrand competition in
the national brand. Both store brands are in the market as long as one retailer ﬁnds







(1 + γ)(2 − γ)2 −
((1 − ε) − (2−ε2
2+ε )w)2
(1 − ε2)(2 − ε)2 .
Therefore, we reach the same qualitative conclusion as in Proposition 1. Whenever
0 <γ<εthe function Φ
price
rr (w) is always positive even for w =0and thus both re-
tailers replace the national brand. For γ>ε ,the manufacturer sets the transfer price,
14¯ wprice, that solves Φ
price
rr (¯ wprice)=0and only one retailer replaces the national brand.
Contingent transfer price.
Now suppose that the manufacturer is capable of setting the transfer price charged to
the retailers conditional on whether the contract is exclusive or not, that is, in the ﬁrst
stage of the game the manufacturer posts a pair (we,wne). Superscript e indicates that
just one retailer sells the manufacturer’s brand; superscript ne corresponds to the case



















9 . Retailer R0
1s unilateral incentive to replace the na-








which is always positive since wne ∈ [0,1] for positive outputs in the (n,n) subgame. Then,
whatever (we,wne) be each retailer will replace the national brand provided the other does
not. Finally, retailer R0
1s incentive to replace the national brand provided the rival has






2 , which is
positive as long as we > ¯ w. Therefore, in the case of contingent transfer prices, the man-
ufacturer’s payoﬀs are independent of wne and coincide with expression (6) where we is
substituted for w. The manufacturer chooses a pair of transfer prices where we =¯ w for
ε<γ<1, any real number otherwise, and wne is always any real number. Then, the
conclusions of Proposition 1 also follow in this context.
Other terms of payment: ﬁx e df e ea n dt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ contracts.
We assume now that, in the ﬁrst stage, the manufacturer proposes retailers the follow-
ing two alternative contracts: a ﬁxed fee contract (w =0 ,F) and a two-part tariﬀ contract,
(w,F) where w is the transfer price and F is the up-front ﬁxed fee to be paid by a retailer
willing to market the national brand. Several conclusions are reached (see the Appendix
for the details). First, concerning the ﬁxed fee contract, no qualitatively diﬀerent results
appear since only one retailer can be retained by the national brand manufacturer and this
requires that γ be greater than ε. On top of that, the ﬁxed fee contract would never be
chosen by the manufacturer since the two-part tariﬀ contract yields higher proﬁts. Second,
there are two interesting ﬁndings regarding two-part tariﬀ contracts (see Proposition in
the Appendix): i) Neither store brand is introduced for both γ and ε close to one, in par-
ticular for 2ε − 1 <γ<min{γn/nn(ε),1} and ε>0.945 (see the horizontal stripped area
in Figure 2); ii) Only one store brand is introduced when max{2ε−1,γ0(ε),γn/nn(ε)} <γ
< 1 and 0 <ε<0.980 (see the light grey and vertical stripped areas in Figure 2);11 iii)
11Note that γ





Figure 2 The manufacturer is unable to keep any retailer in the dark grey area in Figure 2.
Finally, if the manufacturer is able to choose between a linear and a two-part tariﬀ
contract, then we ﬁnd that both types of contracts might be chosen by the manufacturer
at equilibrium: the linear contract in the vertical stripped area and the two-part tariﬀ
contract in both the horizontal stripped and light grey areas in Figure 2. The two-part
tariﬀ contract is used mainly to avoid store brand introduction by retailers when the
linear contract is unable to do it (the horizontal stripped and light grey areas where
γ<ε ), but the linear contract is preferred to the two-part tariﬀ contract in more cases,
for γl/tp(ε) <γ<1 and 0 <ε<0.915. For the cases where max{0,2ε−1} <γ<γ l/tp(ε)
and 0 <ε<0.903, the dark grey area, the manufacturer cannot avoid the introduction of
store brands regardless of the contract used.
4 An Extension to Several National Brands
In this section we are going to consider the case where there are two national brands
and retailers are assumed to be multi-product sellers. Each retailer may carry the two
national brands or replace one of them by its own store brand. Note that these assumptions
enrich the possible market conﬁgurations ranging from a successive duopoly with multi-
product retailers carrying two national brands to a conﬁguration with the highest product
diversity, i.e. the one with the two national and the two store brands. They also allow us to
understand whether retailers, given that store brands are introduced, prefer competition
between national brands rather than intra-brand competition in one of the national brands
keeping the other one out of the market.
We proceed to analyze the following multi-agent and multi-stage game with observed
actions. In the ﬁrst stage, the manufacturers Mi decide simultaneously and independently
on the transfer prices, wi for i =1 ,2. In the second stage, the replacement stage, retailers
decide simultaneously and independently whether to replace national brand one by its
store brand (strategy r1), or replace national brand two by its store brand (strategy r2),
or not to introduce its store brand (strategy r0). A particular subgame will be denoted by
ap a i r(ri,r j) for i,j =0 ,1,2, and where ri denotes retailer one’s choice whereas rj denotes
retailer two’s choice. There is quantity competition in the last stage of the game and then
consumers purchase the products. We will look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the
manufacturer is better oﬀ if the two retailers sell its national brand at equilibrium. Also γ
0(ε) is a
threshold for γ that implies that for γ greater than γ
0(ε) the equilibrium manufacturer payoﬀsw h e no n e
retailer sells the national brand are positive. Finally, γ
l/tp(ε) is a threshold for γ that implies that for γ
greater than the threshold, the manufacturer is better oﬀ if a linear contract is employed rather than a
two-part tariﬀ.
16game.12
The product line mix decision is clearly inﬂuenced by the extent of competition envis-
aged, as captured by the diﬀerent demand parameters, by multi-product retail competition
and by scarce shelf space. The received literature has ignored the strategic interaction in
such a decision which makes interesting in itself to focus on the analysis of the replacement
stage. As mentioned in the introduction, it is a stylized fact that not all retailers introduce
their store brands, and if they have their own brand it is not present in every product
category despite the very many beneﬁts store brands have. We are then particularly inter-
ested in ﬁnding conditions ensuring that none of the retailers will introduce a store brand
as well as for the case where only one retailer replaces one of the national brands while the
r i v a ld o e sn o t .I nv i e wo ft h i s ,w ew i l lﬁrst examine the unilateral incentive to introduce a
store brand (or no store brands in the market whenever such an incentive does not exist),
and then characterize the equilibrium where only one retailer introduces its store brand.
The introduction of a store brand by a retailer has another eﬀect, in this context, in
addition to the direct eﬀect and the exclusivity eﬀect, already mentioned in the case of
one national brand. Since retailers are multiproduct sellers replacement also aﬀects the
decision that the retailer takes regarding the output of the other national brand. Here
it is important which brand types the retailer carries since, for two national brands, the
internalization of competition is weighted by a factor γ whereas it is weighted by ε when
carrying a national brand and its store brand. This additional eﬀect is related with in-
store competition which is the competition among the two brands of a retailer’s product
line, and will be referred to as the in-store eﬀect. Hence for ε smaller than γ in-store
competition is softer if there is replacement. Furthermore, the exclusivity eﬀect is now
more elaborate as it is linked to the strategic behaviour in both the retailers’ choice of
outputs and product line mix. Thus, when a retailer decides to replace a national brand it
is introducing another brand exclusively marketed by that particular retailer, but at the
same time it is granting the rival retailer the role of exclusive seller of the national brand
that is replaced by the former retailer. Then, the exclusivity feature for brands sold at
any particular choice (ri,r j) m a d eb yr e t a i l e r si sa ﬀecting the power that a retailer has
to sustain prices above marginal costs when choosing equilibrium outputs. Note that the
exclusivity eﬀect favours replacement when both brand types are symmetric.13 Finally, it
12Provided the symmetry of national and store brands and the fact that retailers are undiﬀerentiated,
four diﬀerent subgames need to be analyzed out of the possible nine subgames. In particular, the diﬀerent
subgames are: (r0,r 0), (r1,r 0), (r1,r 1) and (r1,r 2); noting that (r0,r 1), (r2,r 0), (r0,r 2), are symmetric
to (r1,r 0); (r2,r 2) is alike to (r1,r 1) and ﬁnally (r2,r 1) is similar to (r1,r 2). The equilibrium outputs
corresponding to each subgame are relegated to the Appendix.
13To isolate the exclusivity eﬀect consider that transfer prices are zero (a null direct eﬀect) and that
γ = ε to make national brands and store brands symmetric, which implies a zero in-store eﬀect. It happens
17is worth mentioning that the direct and the exclusivity eﬀects do not show up in a setting
where the retailer adds a new product to its product line and faces no competition.
4.1 Unilateral incentive to introduce a store brand.
Consider any given pair of transfer prices (w1, w2) and that retailer R2 does not replace
any national brand, will R1 do it? The answer is aﬃrmative if either of the following two
inequalities holds: R
r1r0
1 (w1,w 2) >R
r0r0
1 (w1,w 2) or R
r2r0
1 (w1,w 2) >R
r0r0
1 (w1,w 2). Before
proceeding, we state the following intermediate result.
Consider any given pair of transfer prices (w1, w2) and that one of the retailers does
not replace any national brand. In case the other retailer introduces its store brand, it









2 iﬀ w1 >w 2.
Next, and in order to simplify the analysis and extract some clear-cut conclusions, we
focus on the case where one of the national brands is provided by a competitive fringe
of manufacturers, e.g. national brand two, while the other is provided by a monopolist
manufacturer. Given that, we assume that w1 ≥ w2 =0 , and by the above intermediate





1 (w1,0) - we keep arguing in terms of retailer one, which is
symmetric to retailer two. Besides, it is important to note that when the inequality does
not hold for any retailer we have that the subgame (r0,r 0) is a Nash equilibrium and no
store brands are marketed. With some abuse of notation, we will denote qnkl the output
sold by retailer l of national brand k when national brands are not sold exclusively.
Retailers’ payoﬀs for these subgames can be written as follows, R
r1r0






1 =( 1− γ2)(q
r0r0
n11 )2 + 1
9. Then we ﬁnd that R1 will replace national brand one as
long as q
r1r0
s1 be large enough with respect to the equilibrium output of the replaced brand,








n11 . We now deﬁne x1 =1− w1, where q
r1r0
s1 is decreasing in x1 and
q
r0r0








with the following implication:14 for all x1 <x u there is a unilateral incentive to replace
national brand one. It is proven in the Appendix that xu is a decreasing function in ε and
also that xu evaluated at ε = γ is greater than one, while if evaluated at ε =
1+γ
2 it is
that: i) both retailers sell a lesser amount of the non exclusive brand and at the same price than before
the store brand introduction; ii) both retailers sell a larger amount of the brand they sell exclusively and
at a higher price than before. The replacement by one retailer results in higher proﬁts for both retailers,
then concluding that the exclusivity eﬀect is in favour of replacement.





A2−9(1−ε2)(1−γ2)ε2 , where A =
4(1 + γ) − (5 + 3γ)ε
2.
18smaller than one. We also deﬁne the value for the cross eﬀect across brand types ε such
that xu =1and denote it by εu. Thus, we are ready to state the following results. The
proofs are straightforward.
Proposition 2 There is a unilateral incentive to introduce a store brand for a high enough
transfer price w1. The w1 required is greater as ε approaches
1+γ
2 . Besides, if 0 <ε<γ ,
such unilateral incentive exists irrespective of the value of w1.
Proposition 3 No store brands will be in the market (i.e. (r0,r 0) is a NE) if and only if
ε is suﬃciently large, in any case greater than γ, and w1 low enough.
The consideration both of multiproduct sellers and the strategic behaviour associated
with replacement yield diﬀerent results concerning the univocal relationship between the
cross eﬀect across brand types and the cross eﬀect within brand types established in
the previous section. It seems natural to ﬁnd that a unilateral incentive to store brand
introduction exists when the cross eﬀect within brand types is the highest as this means
that in-store competition is strong; then, a retailer will replace national brand one no
matter the value of the transfer price to better internalize in-store competition. But
replacement can also arise when the cross eﬀect across brand types is the highest of the
two, despite this meaning a negative in-store eﬀect. The shaded area in Figure 3 displays
an interval for ε where the negative in-store eﬀect is, for any transfer price, oﬀset by the
direct and the exclusivity eﬀects. Finally, a retailer is better oﬀ carrying national brand
two and its store brand when the transfer price of national brand one as well as ε are
suﬃciently high. In fact, as the cross eﬀect across brand types increases a higher transfer
price is required for this replacement strategy to be proﬁtable. The reference situation is
a multiproduct duopoly downstream with intra-brand competition in both the national
brands. What Proposition 2 states is when a retailer prefers introducing its store brand
though leaving the rival retailer as the exclusive dealer of national brand one. The fact that
the transfer price of this brand is rather high (a large direct eﬀect) more than compensates
for the exclusivity granted to the rival and a cross eﬀect within brand types below the one
across brand types (a negative in-store eﬀect), thereby making the replacement strategy
proﬁtable. Certainly, a low enough transfer price turns store brand introduction harmful
for retailers and the equilibrium entails no store brands in the market. The analysis with
several national brands leads to conclusions that are in contrast with the previous section.
With one national brand manufacturer, we found that at least one of the retailers decides









 4 . 2 O n es t o r eb r a n di nt h em a r k e t .
We have already noted that there is evidence of some category products with extremely
low penetration rates of store brands (see footnote 3 above). In fact, it is commonly
observed that not all retailers replace national brands in all categories. Our focus in this
section is on characterizing conditions to explain asymmetric retailer behaviour in their
replacement strategies. We now wish to specify conditions under which (r1,r 0) is a Nash
equilibrium, this meaning that one of the retailers does not replace national brand one
although it is supplied at a positive transfer price. This setting entails three brands in
the market, retailer one’s store brand and both the national brands; there is intra-brand
competition in national brand two as it is sold by both retailers and the other is exclusively
sold by retailer two. Three conditions must be simultaneously satisﬁed:
a) retailer one must ﬁnd it proﬁtable to replace national brand one by its store brand,
which corresponds with the unilateral incentive previously analyzed; b) retailer two has
to be better oﬀ not replacing national brand one; c) nor replacing national brand two,





2 (w1,0), where R
r1r0
2 =( 1− γ2)(q
r1r0






s2 )2 + 1







s2 then it happens that retailer R2
does not replace national brand one. There exists an xe deﬁn e db yt h ev a l u eo fx1 that







s2 . Thus for all x1 >x e, retailer two
prefers not to replace national brand one provided retailer one does.15
It is important to underline that if ε =0then xe > 1, if ε = γ then xe =1and
if ε =
1+γ
2 then xe < 1. Besides dxe
dε < 0 when it is evaluated in each of these three
values for ε. We conclude that condition b) can only be satisﬁed for γ<ε .To understand
the intuition behind this, consider the case where ε = γ so that from the retailer two’s
point of view, national brand one and its store brand only diﬀer by the transfer price
paid. Both brands are exclusive brands for him and they would suppose the same level of
in-store competition. Therefore, in case both brand types coincide in the transfer price,
i.e. x1 =1 , then the equilibrium outputs q
r1r0
n12 (x1 =1 )and q
r1r1
s2 are equal and hence
the retailer is indiﬀerent between both the national and the store brand. Now it is easy
to understand that when γ is smaller than ε at the transfer price w1 =0 , the intensity
of in-store competition is weaker when the two national brands are carried. Therefore,
retailer two obtains higher proﬁts when non replacement. As a consequence, for γ<εthe
transfer price that makes the retailer indiﬀerent is greater than zero (i.e. xe < 1).




2 (w1,0),n o t et h a tb o t h
these subgames imply that retailer two is an exclusive dealer of national brand one; it







21therefore becomes important to see how intense is competition from the other product
carried by retailer two. This certainly depends on the feature of exclusivity inherited by
retailer one’s store brand introduction. On the one hand, if retailer two does not introduce
its store brand then he will hold exclusivity in one of the national brands but will face
intra-brand competition in the other - subgame (r1,r 0). On the other hand, in case he
opts for store brand introduction then the four brand types will be in the market and
retailer two will be the sole dealer of two of them, its store brand and one of the national
brands - subgame (r1,r 2). Both of the above possibilities are aﬀected by the size of ε.
Retailer two’s payoﬀs can be expressed as follows: R
r1r0
2 =( 1− γ2)(q
r1r0
















n1 . It is also important to remark
that q
r1r2
n1 is increasing in x1, whereas q
r1r2






decreasing otherwise.16 Besides, it can be proven that R
r1r2
2 is increasing in x1. We next
deﬁne by xne+ and xne− the two roots that solve R
r1r0
2 (x1) − R
r1r2
2 (x1)=0 , a quadratic
polynomial in x1 which can be concave or convex. It occurs that when the polynomial
is concave, then condition c) holds for xne− <x 1 <x ne+. Then a suﬃciently low x1 is
required so that retailer two would better not introduce its store brand.
In sum, (r1,r 0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if condition a (x1 <x u); condition b
(x1 >x e) and condition c ( xne− <x 1 <x ne+) are simultaneously satisﬁed for γ<ε .F o r




The shaded area in Figure 4 identiﬁes, given γ =0 .3, parameter conditions for ε
and w1 such that (r1,r 0) is a Nash equilibrium in the replacement stage. A necessary
condition is that the cross eﬀect across brand types exceeds the cross eﬀect within brand
types (γ<ε ), a negative in-store eﬀect. Given this, an equilibrium with only one store
brand typically arises for intermediate values of ε and for a given interval of the transfer
price w1. First of all, the transfer price must be high enough to induce replacement by
one of the retailers, which implies a large enough direct eﬀect. The equilibrium output
of the store brand increases in w1 whereas the equilibrium output of national brand one
decreases in w1; the right transfer price level combined with appropriate values of the
demand parameters precisely make the replacement strategy proﬁtable. Secondly, the
transfer price has to be suﬃciently low to discourage replacement of national brand one




3 is positive iﬀ γ>2(2 −
√
3) ' 0.5358).
17Figure 4 includes the graphs of the expressions x
a and x
b which stand for the lower value for x1
that ensures positive equilibrium outputs for all subgames. In particular, x
a=1 − w
a













2((2−γ)2−ε2) =0 ; while x
b=1 − w
b















 would not be in the market and the corresponding equilibrium quantities would not depend
on the transfer price w1. Thus, since retailer two’s payoﬀs are decreasing in the transfer
price when replacement does not occur we have that store brand introduction is precluded
for a low enough transfer price. Last but not least, we must also ensure that retailer two
would be worse oﬀ if replacing national brand two. The two market conﬁgurations to
be compared suppose that national brand one is carried exclusively by retailer two; the
equilibrium output of that brand decreases in the transfer price w1. It is the other product
sold that makes a diﬀerence although their equilibrium outputs increase in the transfer
price. T h ef a c tt h a tt h ec r o s se ﬀect within brand types γ is smaller than the cross eﬀect
across brand types ε is in favour of not replacing. Still, a suﬃciently high transfer price
is required for no store brand introduction to be the equilibrium choice of retailer two.
Overall, retailer two’s proﬁts are decreasing in the transfer price in both these subgames.
No replacement is explained by the fact that the variation in proﬁts is more marked in
subgame (r1,r 2). Hence, being a common retailer of national brand two is preferred for a
suﬃciently high transfer price. However, as the cross eﬀect across brand types increases,
competition downstream is more intense if both retailers introduce their store brands; the
required transfer price need not be too high to have replacement by just one of the retailers
(in fact, high values of ε guarantee that national brand two is not replaced by retailer two
regardless of the value of the transfer price).
At this point one wonders whether the replacement stage equilibrium (r1,r 0) is part
of the equilibrium of the full game. In other words, we wish to ensure that the range of
parameters for which (r1,r 0) is an equilibrium of the full game is non-empty. We now pro-
ceed with the example in Figure 4 to solve for the ﬁrst stage of the proposed multi-stage
game. The next table summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium for diﬀerent values of
the cross eﬀect across brand types.
ε 0.3 0.4 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.6
w∗
1 0.08857 0.06545 0.05663 0.07099 0.07431 0.10622
replacement stage (r1,r 2)( r1,r 2)( r1,r 0)( r1,r 0)( r0,r 0)( r0,r 0)
It illustrates that the manufacturer, by choosing the right transfer price, w∗
1, will induce
the replacement stage equilibrium that maximizes its payoﬀs. How is w∗
1computed? Take
the case for ε =0 .49. It happens that w∗
1 is obtained from xe evaluated at γ =0 .3
and ε =0 .49. If the manufacturer set a higher transfer price then it would induce the
replacement equilibrium (r1,r 1) which is not an optimal choice. Now, a suﬃciently low
transfer price would induce (r0,r 0); it is the one obtained from xu evaluated at γ =0 .3 and
ε =0 .49,w 1 =0 .03917. The manufacturer then selects w∗
1 since it is better oﬀ with one
24retailer at a higher transfer price than employing two retailers but a lower transfer price. A
similar procedure applies for other values of ε. We conclude that {w∗
1 =0 .07099, (r1,r 0)}
is an equilibrium for the full game. On the other hand, if ε =0 .52 the manufacturer is
better oﬀ when it implements (r0,r 0) by setting w∗
1 =0 .07431.
Finally, note that in case ε =0 .45 the manufacturer must decide whether implementing
the replacement equilibrium (r1,r 0) by setting w∗
1 =0 .05663 or implementing the replace-
ment equilibrium (r1,r 2) by setting the transfer price obtained from xne+ evaluated at
γ =0 .3 and ε =0 .45,w 1 =0 .04764. The manufacturer is better oﬀ with the former
option. Thus {w∗
1 =0 .05663, (r1,r 0)} is an equilibrium for the full game.
It is worth remarking that a) the equilibrium transfer price is lower than the interior
solution, and b) there are three equilibria in the replacement stage that appear in the
equilibrium for the full game. In particular, there are combinations of ε, γ, and w1 where
both retailers would choose (r1,r 1) but this is never in the manufacturer’s interest.
We are claiming that manufacturer of national brand one, who holds market power,
can keep itself in the market with a certain transfer price, and for a given combination of
the cross eﬀects parameters. Even more, for some parameter values we ﬁnd that national
brand two, though supplied by a competitive fringe of manufacturers, is sold by both
retailers - this national brand is similar to a store brand in costs terms. The analysis
suggests that it is retailer interaction and demand conditions that determine the variety
of equilibria rather than an issue of market power. To further emphasize this point we
brieﬂy discuss the case where both national brands are supplied by a competitive fringe
of manufacturers.
4.3 The case of no market power upstream
This subsection is aimed at providing some theoretical basis that the emergence of market
conﬁgurations where none of the retailers or only one of them introduce its store brand
is not to be attributed to the existence of upstream market power, which might be used
to retain retailers. Rather it results from retailer strategic interaction and a particular
relationship between the demand parameters. In this particular context, only the in-store
and the exclusivity eﬀects derived from the store brand introduction are present.
Consider that both national brands are supplied competitively, which amounts to the
case when both transfer prices, w1 and w2 are equal to zero, i.e. to the case where
x1 =1a b o v e . W em a yt h e np r e s e n tt h ea n a l y s i ss o l e l yi nt e r m so ft h ec r o s se ﬀects γ
and ε. Let us now deﬁne the values for the cross eﬀect across brand types ε such that
xe =1and xne+ =1and denote them by εe and εne, respectively. Further note that
εu,ε e and εne are a function of γ, where εe is equal to γ, and that both εu and εne are
25greater than γ and smaller than
1+γ
2 as indicated above. It also happens that εu <ε ne
for γ<0.58677, the opposite otherwise. How to link these threshold values εu,ε eand
εne to the previous analysis? The former has to do with the unilateral incentive to store
brand introduction (condition a above) so that values of the cross eﬀect across brand









2 . For the interpretation of the other two, consider that one retailer has
decided to market its store brand, then the εe threshold is related with the replacement of
the same national brand already replaced by the rival (condition b above) and the latter is
related with replacing a diﬀerent national brand than the rival retailer (condition c above).





1 ; and values below εne mean that the latter replacement strategy is preferred









Finally, using the result stated above if w1 and w2 are equal then both national brands








2 . Also, the following
Lemma can be shown (see the Appendix ).
Lemma 1 In case of store brand introduction by both retailers, each retailer always prefers









2 for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j, ∀ γ ∈ (0,1) and ∀ ε ∈ (0,
1+γ
2 ).
This result means that, provided both retailers introduce its store brand, exclusivity
on both national brands is preferred to intra-brand competition in one of them. In other
words, replacement of the same national brand by both retailers is not an equilibrium in
the replacement stage. The intuition can be cast in terms of the well known dampening-
of-competition eﬀect of exclusive dealing but now in a setting with two multi-product
retailers.
We proceed by noting that εe = γ and that εe is the lowest of the thresholds, then we
can distinguish two diﬀerent cases depending on the sign of the in-store eﬀect.
i) Consider a positive in-store eﬀect: 0 <ε<γand 0 <γ<1. It happens that the













1 (mutatis mutandis for retailer two). Therefore, the following result
is obtained:
Proposition 4 If ε<γthere is a NE in the replacement stage where each retailer replaces
o n ea n dad i ﬀerent national brand to that of the rival. This is obtained without market
p o w e ru p s t r e a ma n df o ra l lγ ∈ (0,1).







two diﬀerent subcases: ii.1) for 0 <γ<0.58677, where the following ranking holds γ<ε u
26<ε ne <
1+γ
2 ; ii.2) for 0.58677 <γ<1, where γ<ε ne <ε u <
1+γ
2 . We may characterize
the Nash equilibrium in each of the two diﬀerent subcases and ﬁnd that only two diﬀerent
equilibria arise for the case where γ<0.58677 : either both retailers opt for the replacement
strategy if γ<ε<ε u, or no store brand is marketed if εne <ε<
1+γ
2 , or ﬁnally the two
type of equilibria arise when εu <ε<ε ne. Next, for the ii.2) subcase three diﬀerent
equilibria arise as stated in the next Proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider 0.58677 <γ<1, the following pair of strategies are the NE in
the replacement stage:
a) Both retailers decide to replace one diﬀerent national brand when ε ∈ (γ,εne)
b) Only one retailer introduces its store brand for ε ∈ (εne,ε u).
c) Finally, store brands are not introduced when ε ∈ (εu,
1+γ
2 ).
This simpliﬁed setting oﬀe r sa l lt h epo s s i b l ee q u i l i b r i ao n em a yﬁnd. Let us elaborate on
the latter subcase since it is here where competition intensity is stronger because products
are less diﬀerentiated and this highlights the eﬀects of retail strategic behaviour. We can
see that the replacement strategy chosen by retailers can be explained by how distant the
cross eﬀect across brand types is from the cross eﬀect within brand types. As the former
cross eﬀect increases, retailers are at equilibrium less inclined towards replacement. This
occurs because the store brand is perceived by consumers as more similar than the national
brand to be replaced relative to the other national brand. Therefore, when ε is very large
(part c) in Proposition 5, replacement would increase signiﬁcantly the negative in-store
eﬀect which could not be compensated for by the positive exclusivity eﬀect of selling a
store brand, thus leading to a no replacement strategy for both retailers. On the other
hand, when ε is close to γ, the exclusivity eﬀect always dominates the in-store eﬀect.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Private labels are an important phenomenon both in European and U.S. retailing and
increasing in importance. This paper looks at the strategic interaction between national
brands and private labels in a retail duopoly when each retailer can stock a limited number
of brands. While the model leaves some issues unexplained, nevertheless it does provide a
theoretical argument to better understand why we observe a varied pattern of store brand
introduction across outlets and across product categories. Multiproduct retailers have to
decide their product line mix in order to better internalize in-store competition while also
alleviating retail competition, in addition to the direct eﬀect that results from replacement
of a national brand by a store brand. We contribute to the received literature by drawing
attention to how consumers diﬀerently perceive brand types. Our simple approach suﬃces
27to explain diﬀerent levels of private label penetration once accounting for retailer strate-
gic interaction; we provide a theoretical justiﬁcation as to why undiﬀerentiated retailers
undertake diﬀerent equilibrium strategies about private label introduction. Diﬀerently, a
store brand’s poor performance can be explained in case a retailer has introduced it when
that strategy is not optimal for given demand conditions. The results have been obtained
neither assuming demand or cost asymmetries that favour store brand introduction, nor
demand or cost uncertainties. Other features also characterize the retail sector and our
analysis seems a natural starting point for further research.
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30A Robustness
A.1 Timing
We consider the following timing: ﬁrstly, R1 decides whether to replace, secondly, M
chooses the transfer price and, ﬁnally, R2 decides whether to replace.
a) R1 decides to replace the national brand by its store brand.
For any given w, the third stage payoﬀst oR2 are obtained as follows.
a.1) If it decides to introduce its store brand, then the manufacturer is left out of the














Therefore, R2 introduces the store brand when R1 does so if and only if Rrr
2 −Rrn
2 > 0,
that is, for w>
(2−ε)(γ−ε)
2(2+γ) ≡ ¯ w.
In the second stage the manufacturer decides on the proﬁt maximizing value of the
transfer price. Note that w will depend on previous retailer one’s choice, that is w(r) or










for0 ≤ w(r) ≤ ¯ w
0 for ¯ w<w (r) < 1
From the inspection of the critical value ¯ w, it is clear that for γ<ε ,ﬁrms’ payoﬀs
are Mrr =0and Rrr
1 = Rrr
2 = 1
(2+γ)2 because M is unable to retain R2. However,
for γ>ε ,by similar reasoning as in the text, the manufacturer sets the transfer price
w(r)=
(2−ε)(γ−ε)









b) R1 does not introduce its store brand.
In this case, M knows that R0
2s decision is to introduce its store brand regardless
of w. Therefore, M solves an unrestricted maximization problem on w(n), which yields
w(n)=2−ε








In stage one R1 compares 1
(2+γ)2 with 1




γ<1. It follows that R1 always introduces its store brand.
A.2 Other terms of payment
We consider two alternative terms of payment to linear contracts: a) the ﬁxed fee contract,
a contract with a zero transfer price and a positive ﬁxed up-front fee, {w =0 ,F }; and b)
the two-part tariﬀ contract,a contract including a variable and a ﬁxed payment, {w, F}.
31Finally, we compare the linear contract {w, F =0 } with the two-part tariﬀ in part c)
below.
a) Fixed fee contract.
Retailers’ payoﬀs for each subgame that arises at the end of the second stage are:
Rnn
1 (w =0 )=Rnn
2 (w =0 )=1
9 − F, Rrn
1 (w =0 )=Rnr
2 (w =0 )= 1
(2+ε)2 − F,
Rrn
2 (w =0 )=Rnr





- A retailer’s best reply, say R1, in the second stage is as follows.
First, R1 introduces its store brand when R2 does not if and only if Rrn
1 (w =0 )−
Rnn
1 (w =0 )=Φr(w =0 )+F is positive. As happens in the linear price contract, this
diﬀerence is always positive since now a positive constant has been added.
Second, R1 introduces its store brand when R2 does if and only if the diﬀerence Rrr
1 −
Rnr
1 (w =0 )=Φrr(w =0 ) +F i sp o s i t i v e .T h i si ss oi fe i t h e rΦrr(w =0 )=
(4+γ+ε)(ε−γ)
(2+γ)2(2+ε)2 >
0 regardless of F, or F>−Φrr(w =0 )when γ>ε .Since the manufacturer’s payoﬀsa r e
M(w =0 ,F)=F if Rrr
1 − Rnr
1 (w =0 )< 0, or zero otherwise, the manufacturer sets
the highest F that makes the retailer not to replace the national brand, that is Ff =
−Φrr(w =0 )=
(4+γ+ε)(γ−ε)
(2+γ)2(2+ε)2 , superscript f stands for ﬁxed fee. Thus, the manufacturer’s
payoﬀsa r eMf = Ff, which are positive for ε<γ<1. Note that this result would have
been obtained when a two-part tariﬀ contract had been implemented with the restriction
of a nonnegative transfer price.
b) Two-part tariﬀ contract.




















W ea n a l y z et w op o s s i b l es i t u a t i o n s ,i )t h a tb oth retailers sell the national brand; and
ii) that only one of them does.
-i) The diﬀerence Rrn
1 (w) − Rnn
1 (w)=Φr(w)+F is positive regardless of F as long
as Φr(w) > 0, which holds for w ∈ (
−(2−ε)(1−ε)
(4−ε)(1+ε) ,1 − ε
2). However, Φr(w) is negative for
w smaller than
−(2−ε)(1−ε)
(4−ε)(1+ε) . Therefore, Rrn
1 (w) − Rnn
1 (w) > 0 for F>−Φr(w) and
w<
−(2−ε)(1−ε)
(4−ε)(1+ε) . Then, if the manufacturer wants to retain a retailer provided that the




+2 F, subject to F ≤− Φr(w) and w<
−(2 − ε)(1 − ε)
(4 − ε)(1 + ε)
.
The maximization yields w
tp
nn = 16−36ε+10ε2+ε3
2(32−7ε2+2ε4) , which is smaller than
−(2−ε)(1−ε)
(4−ε)(1+ε) for




4(32−7ε2+2ε4)2 which is positive for
ε greater than 0.6995. Superscript tp stands for two-part tariﬀ. Substituting back, the
32manufacturer’s proﬁts are equal to M
tp
nn = −16+24ε−8ε2+ε4
2(32−7ε2+2ε4) , where M
tp
nn is positive for ε
greater than 0.9180. Then we conclude that the option for the manufacturer to retain
both retailers is only possible for ε greater than 0.9180.
-ii) The diﬀerence Rrr
1 − Rnr
1 (w)=Φrr(w)+F is positive if either Φrr(w) > 0 re-
gardless of F, or if F>−Φrr(w) when w ≤ ¯ w ≡
(2−ε)(γ−ε)

























greater than 2ε − 1 for ε>2










where γ0(ε) > 2ε−1 for 0 <ε<0.9031 and γ0(ε) <ε. Therefore, the option of retaining





nn is a second degree concave polynomial in γ. It is negative as





2. Superscript n/nn stands for the comparison between cases i) and ii). It follows that
γn/nn(ε) < 2ε − 1 for 0 <ε<0.943 and γn/nn(ε) > 1 for ε>0.980. Combining the









nn < 0, yields the next result. See Figure 2 in the text.
Proposition 6 Consider that the manufacturer sets a two part tariﬀ contract.
a) The manufacturer cannot retain any retailer for γ ∈ [max{0,2ε − 1},γ0(ε)] and 0 <
ε<0.903.




n ) and retains only one retailer as long as either,
b.1) γ ∈ [γ0(ε),1] and 0 <ε<0.903, or
b.2) γ ∈ [2ε − 1,1] and 0.903 <ε<0.943, or
b.3) γ ∈ [γn/nn(ε),1] and 0.943 <ε<0.980.




nn) and retains both retailers as long as γ ∈ [2ε −
1,min{γn/nn(ε),1}] and 0.943 <ε<1.
Furthermore, the variable part of the two part tariﬀ contract is always set below zero at
equilibrium.
Finally we compare the manufacturer’s proﬁts when either a ﬁxed fee contract or a two-
part tariﬀ contract is used. Note that this comparison is only meaningful for Mf > 0 i.e.
γ>ε .The diﬀerence M
tp
n − Mf = ε4
8(2+ε)2(2−ε2) is always positive, then a ﬁxed fee contract
is never endogenously chosen by the manufacturer.
The two-part tariﬀ contract is preferred to the ﬁxed fee contract by the manufacturer.
c) Linear vs. two-part tariﬀ contracts.
33Finally, consider that the manufacturer has the option to choose between a linear
price and a two part tariﬀ contract. Note that the linear contract option is only possible









(2−ε)(6+ε−4ε2) . Superscript l/tp stands for
the comparison between linear and two-part tariﬀ contracts. It follows that γl/tp(ε) >ε
for all ε and 0 <γ l/tp(ε) < 1 for 0 <ε<0.915.
Proposition 7 The manufacturer is better oﬀ with a linear price contract for γ ∈ [γl/tp(ε),1]
and 0 <ε<0.915.
The manufacturer is better oﬀ with a two-part tariﬀ contract for γ ∈ [max{γ0(ε),2ε −
1},min{γl/tp(ε),1}] and 0 <ε<1.
If both retailers introduce their store brands then the manufacturer is indiﬀerent between
either contract, which happens for γ ∈ [max{0,2ε − 1},γ0(ε)] and 0 <ε<0.903.
B Several National Brands.
B.1 Third Stage Equilibrium: Several National Brands.
We display in this Appendix the equilibrium outputs of the following subgames.
(r0,r 0)− Subgame
The national brands are sold by both retailers, no store brand is marketed.











Equilibrium outputs are positive as long as γ<1−w1
1−w2 < 1
γ.
Equilibrium retailers’ margins are,
pr0r0




n2 (w1,w 2) − w2 =
(1−w2)
3
Consider the case where w2 =0 . Note that the ﬁrst order conditions for retailer R1’s
optimization problem are pr0r0
n1 (w1,0) − w1 = qr0r0
n11 (w1,0) + γqr0r0
n21 (w1,0),
pr0r0
n2 (w1,0) = qr0r0
n21 (w1,0)+γqr0r0
n11 (w1,0) and we know that pr0r0
n2 (w1,0) = 1
3. Then the
following expression follows qr0r0
n21 = 1
3 − γqr0r0
n11 . Thus it is easy to write R1’s payoﬀsa s :
Rr0r0
1 (w1,0) = (1 − γ2)(qr0r0
n11 (w1,0))2 + 1
9.
Similarly for R2’s payoﬀs
Rr0r0
2 (w1,0) = (1 − γ2)(qr0r0
n12 (w1,0))2 + 1
9.
34(r1,r 0)− Subgame


















Equilibrium retailers’ margins are
pr1r0











Consider the case where w2 =0 . Note that the ﬁrst order conditions for R1’s problem
are
pr1r0
n2 (w1,0) = qr1r0
n21 (w1,0) + εqr1r0
s1 (w1,0),p r1r0
s1 (w1,0) = qr1r0
s1 (w1,0) + εqr1r0
n21 (w1,0),
and by pr1r0
n2 (w1,0) = 1
3, the following expression follows qr1r0
n21 = 1
3 − εqr1r0
s1 .T h u s R1’s
payoﬀsr e a d
Rr1r0
1 (w1,0) = (1 − ε2)(qr1r0
s1 (w1,0))2 + 1
9.
For R2 we have that pr1r0
n1 (w1,0) − w1 = qr1r0
n12 (w1,0) + γqr1r0
n22 (w1,0),
pr1r0
n2 (w1,0) = qr1r0
n22 (w1,0) + γqr1r0
n12 (w1,0). Using pr0r0





n12 . Thus it is easy to write R2’s payoﬀsa s :
Rr1r0
2 (w1,0) = (1 − γ2)(qr1r0
n12 (w1,0))2 + 1
9.
(r1,r 1)− Subgame











Equilibrium outputs are positive as long as 3ε
2+γ < (1 − w2) < 1
ε.
Equilibrium retailers’ margins are
pr1r1
n21 (w2) − w2 = pr1r1








For w2 =0 , note that the ﬁrst order conditions for retailer Rj are pr1r1
n2 (0) = qr1r1
n2i (0)+
εqr1r1
si (0) = 1
3,
pr1r1
si (0) = qr1r1
si (0) + εqr1r1
n1i (0). From the former condition we obtain qr1r1




Then, R2’s and R1’s payoﬀsr e a d
35Rr1r1
i (0) = (1 − ε2)(qr1r1
si (0))2 + 1
9,i=1 ,2.
(r2,r 2)− Subgame
Only national brand one is marketed while both store brands are present. The ex-
pressions for the equilibrium outputs qr2r2
n11 (w1)=qr2r2
n12 (w1) and qr2r2
s1 (w1)=qr2r2
s2 (w1) are
the same as for qr1r1
n21 (w2)=qr1r1
n22 (w2), and qr1r1
s1 (w2)=qr1r1
s2 (w2), respectively, writing w1
instead of w2 (and viceversa). Similarly for margins.
Equilibrium outputs are positive as long as 3ε
2+γ < (1 − w1) < 1
ε.
Note that the ﬁrst order conditions for Ri are pr2r2













Then, retailers’ payoﬀsr e a d
Rr2r2





The two national brands are marketed and both retailers also market their store brand.
The equilibrium outputs, and retail margins are,
q
r1r2





2((2−γ)2−ε2) ,i =1 ,2
q
r1r2
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n1 )2 +( q
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CP r o o f s
P r o o fo fR e s u l t1 .
We use in the proof the following notation: xi =1− wi,i=1 ,2; and A =4 ( 1+γ) −
(5 + 3γ)ε2 > 0. The diﬀerence Rr1r0
1 − Rr2r0
1 can be written as the sum of two terms, one








36It is easy to prove that the ﬁrst term is always positive while the second is positive for
as u ﬃciently large (x1 + x2).
Collecting both terms we get that Rr1r0
1 − Rr2r0
1 > 0 if and only if
(x2 − x1)[(16(1 + γ)2 − (1 + γ)(13 + 15γ)ε2 − 2(1 + 3γ)ε4)(x1 + x2)
−36(1 + γ)2ε(1 − ε2)] > 0
Note that the second factor is positive as long as (x1+x2) >
36(1+γ)2ε(1−ε2)
(16(1+γ)2−(1+γ)(13+15γ)ε2−2(1+3γ)ε4)
where the denominator is positive for all (ε,γ) in their relevant domain. We prove that the
above condition is always satisﬁed since by adding up the conditions for qr1r0
n21 (w1,w 2) and
qr2r0







(16(1+γ)2−(1+γ)(13+15γ)ε2−2(1+3γ)ε4) iﬀ (1 + γ − 2ε2)A>0 which is true for all (ε,γ)
in their relevant domain. Then, we conclude that Rr1r0
1 − Rr2r0
1 > 0 iﬀ (x2 − x1) > 0.
Proof that xu is decreasing in ε
The function F(xu,ε)=( 1− ε2)(q
r1r0
s1 (xu,ε))2 − (1 − γ2)(q
r0r0
n11 (xu,ε))2 =0implicitly





































∂ε (1 − ε2) − 2ε(q
r1r0


























s1 ) < 0
in order to dxu
dε be negative.















∂ε (1 − ε2) − εq
r1r0
s1 ) < 0 when
−(2 + γ + x1)[4(1 + γ) − (3 + 5γ)ε2]+2 ( 1+γ)ε(2(3 + γ) − (5 + 3γ)ε2) < 0.
Secondly, we know two things, that 4(1 + γ) − (3 + 5γ)ε2 > 0 for all ε ∈ (0,
1+γ
2 ),
and that x1 >γin order to q
r0r0
n11 > 0. Thus, the above expression is negative if −2(1 +
γ)[4(1 + γ) − (3 + 5γ)ε2]+2 ( 1+γ)ε(2(3 + γ) − (5 + 3γ)ε2) < 0, or equivalently when
−4(1 + γ)+2 ( 1− γ)ε +( 5+3 γ)ε2 < 0.





















Then we conclude that dxu
dε < 0.




2 is given by the sign of (1 − γ)K(γ,ε)
where
K(γ,ε)=2 0+2 4 γ +9γ2 +γ3 −6(2−γ −γ2)ε−(69+33γ +6γ2)ε2 +18(1−γ)ε3 +54ε4.
37Take the ﬁrst partial derivative with respect to ε, which is given by
∂K
∂ε
= −6[2 − γ − γ2 +( 2 3+1 1 γ +2 γ2)ε − (9 − γ)ε2 − 36ε3]
It is negative if and only if [2−γ−γ2+(23+11γ+2γ2)ε−(9−γ)ε2−36ε3] is positive.
Note that [2−γ−γ2+(23+11γ+2γ2)ε−(9−γ)ε2−36ε3] >ε [(23+11γ+2γ2)−(9−γ)ε−36ε2].
The polynomial (23+11γ +2γ2)−(9−γ)ε−36ε2 is positive as long as ε takes on values
between the roots. It can be checked that the smallest root is negative and that the upper
bound on ε is smaller than the greatest root. Therefore the polynomial is positive for all
ε ∈ (0,
1+γ
2 ) and it follows that ∂K
∂ε is negative.
Since ∂K
∂ε is negative, it suﬃces to prove that K(γ,ε) is positive when evaluated at
ε =
1+γ
2 . It happens that K(γ,
1+γ
2 )=1
8(19 − 30γ +1 4 γ3 − 3γ4) which is positive ∀
γ ∈ (0,1).
38